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This study investigates the impact of union organization on the wages 
and labor practices of establishments newly organized in the 1980s. 
It uses a research design in which establishments are "paired" with 
their closest nonunion competitor. It finds that, unionism had only a 
modest effect on wages in the newly organized plants, which contrasts 
sharply with the huge union wage impact found in cross-section com- 
parisons  of union and nonunion individuals,  but unionism substantially 
alters several personnel practices, creating grievance systems, greater 
seniority protection, and job bidding and posting. That newly orga- 
nized establishments adopt union working conditions but grant only 
modest wage  increases suggests that "collective voice" rather than 
monopoly  wage gains is the key to understanding new unionism. 
Studies of the economic effects of unionization have traditionally focused 
on differences  between union and nonunion workers (Freeman and Medoff 
1984; Lewis 1986), in large part because of the availability of cross-section 
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and longitudinal  data  sets on individuals.  Because  unions have had little 
organizing  success  in the 1970s  and 1980s,  however,  the vast majority  of 
union  workers  in such  data  sets are  employed  in establishments  that  were 
organized  decades  earlier.  Analyses  of the wages of these workers  may 
present  a misleading  picture  of the economic effects of the new union 
organization  that  might  be expected  to influence  the decisions  of currently 
nonunion  management  and labor  to support  or oppose union organizing 
drives.  In a period  when union wage increases  have fallen  short  of those 
of nonunion  workersl and  the  union  share  of employment  has  contracted, 
the impact  of newly organized  unions  on wages and working  conditions 
can reasonably  be expected  to differ  from  that of existing  unions. 
What  has  been  the  economic  impact  of successful  union  organizing  drives 
in the 1980s?  Has new unionization  raised  wages substantially  or altered 
working  conditions  greatly  in the period?  To answer  these questions,  in 
1986  we surveyed  203 establishments  that had National Labor  Relations 
Board  (NLRB) elections  in the 1980s  and 161  "control"  firms  that  did not 
face union organizing  drives.  By focusing  on establishments  rather  than 
workers  and  by using  a before/after  research  design,  we are  able  to examine 
what  new unionization  did to wages  and  benefits,  personnel  practices,  and 
employment.  Thus, we are able to estimate  the "marginal"  rather  than 
average  effects  of unionization  in the period. 
Our principal  finding  is that in the 1980s  new unionization  produced 
wage and benefit  gains  far  below those implied  by standard  cross-section 
analyses  of union wage effects.  At the same  time we find that newly or- 
ganized  workers  made  significant  gains  in the  areas  of grievance  procedures, 
job  posting and bidding, and seniority protection. Consistent with a modest 
effect of new unionism on wages, moreover,  we find modestly lower growth 
of  employment  in newly  unionized  establishments than in our control 
group of establishments. While we cannot determine with any certainty 
the extent to which  the relatively weak union impact on wages in our 
sample is due to the economic conditions of the 1980s (a "period" effect), 
the pattern of  gains in first contracts (an  "age" effect),  or the specific 
characteristics  of establishments that were organized in the period (a "vin- 
tage" effect), our results demonstrate that one cannot extrapolate extant 
estimates of union/nonunion  wage differences to newly organized estab- 
lishments. That newly  unionized plants adopt standard union working 
conditions suggests, moreover, that the industrial jurisprudence (Slichter, 
Healy, and Livernash  1960) or collective voice (Freeman and Medoff 1984), 
rather  than the monopoly face of unionism, is the essence of the institution. 
' Estimates from Current  Wage  Developments  from the Bureau  of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) for January 1987 show that for the period 1981-86 union wage rates grew 
an average of 4.4% per year while nonunion wages increased an average of 5% 
per year. Sio  Freeman/Kleiner 
We present the evidence and arguments for these claims in three parts. 
In Section I we describe our survey methodology,  a "semiexperimental" 
design that involves paired comparisons of establishments to control for 
unobserved differences between firms that face/do  not face union orga- 
nizing drives. In Section II we give our basic estimates of what new union 
organization does to wage and personnel practices. In Section III we probe 
the results for econometric problems and discuss alternative  interpretations 
of the findings. 
I.  Issues and Methodology 
Standard analyses of the union wage premium in the United States es- 
timate that the wages of union workers exceed those of nonunion workers 
in cross-section data by  15%-25% (Lewis  1986) and that the wages of 
workers who switch union status in longitudinal data is about 10%  higher 
in the union status (Freeman 1984;  Lewis 1986). Neither of these estimates, 
however, is likely to gage accurately the impact of unionism on the wages 
of establishments organized in the 1980s, nor the wage costs (to  firms) 
and benefits (to workers) of successful organizing drives. Because unions 
have organized few workplaces in the past two decades, estimates of union 
effects based on cross-section data essentially contrast the impact of unions 
on workers in firms organized years ago (in the 1970s and 1960s or earlier) 
to workers in other firms. Estimates based on longitudinal data, moreover, 
contrast workers who change union status by moving to or from already 
organized workplaces rather than contrasting workers in plants that are 
newly organized with those in plants that remain nonunion. 
There are three reasons for expecting the economic effects of new union 
organization in the 1980s to differ from the wage difference between work- 
ers in already existing union and nonunion workplaces. First is the unfa- 
vorable economic environment of the period: the decline in union repre- 
sentation, deregulation of industries, increased foreign competition, and 
high unemployment that are likely to have raised the elasticity of labor 
demand facing newly organized labor and the reduced the ability of the 
unions to raise wages.2 In an environment in which many existing unions 
lowered their premium over nonunion labor, it is plausible to expect that 
new unions faced a particularly difficult task of establishing premium in 
the first instance.3 
2 In  virtually  all  models  of union  behavior,  increases  in the  elasticity  of the  demand 
for labor  reduces  union  wage gains. 
3There are  two reasons  for expecting  new unions  to have  trouble  raising  wages 
significantly  in this  environment.  First,  the  decline  in the  union  premium  for  already 
organized  workers  can  be taken  as an indicator  of the weakness  of the demand  for 
labor  in the  period.  Second,  newly  organized  workers  are  influenced  by the pattern 
of wage  increases  (rather  than  levels)  among  already  organized  workers. Impact  of New Unionization  Sl1 
Second, union impacts on newly organized workers are likely to differ 
from those on previously organized workers because first contracts are 
likely to produce different outcomes than later contracts, as has been rec- 
ognized at least since the days of Paul Douglas. In his 1930 book on real 
wages in the United  States, Douglas  argued that unions pushed for es- 
pecially large wage gains in their first contract, presumably to strengthen 
the loyalty of the newly organized workers, and that after the first contract, 
union wages would increase at about the same rate as nonunion wages: 
"Unionism, in other words, very probably does give an appreciable  increase 
in earnings during the early period of effective organization, but during 
the later and more mature years of union development, the relative rate 
of further  progress seems ...  to be no more rapid on the whole for unionists 
than for non-unionists" (Douglas  1930, p. 564). Other analysts, however, 
argue the converse: that unions are less concerned with wages than with 
union security provisions like dues checkoffs in their first contract; thus 
they produce small wage gains with first contracts. In the education sector, 
where collective bargaining  is a relatively  recent phenomenon, the evidence 
suggests that teacher unions obtained only modest wage gains in first con- 
tracts (Freeman 1986). However, that situation could differ in the private 
sector. 
A third reason for expecting differences  in union effects between existing 
and newly organized plants are vintage effects due to the distinct charac- 
teristics of establishments or workers organized in the 1980s compared to 
those organized earlier.  The infrequency of organization in the 1980s sug- 
gests, in particular,  that newly organized plants were likely to have different 
characteristics than other plants. Labor/management  relations may have 
been particularly poor in the plants that became union, making workers 
especially favorable to unions, or management may have been less opposed 
to unions in those plants than elsewhere, possibly because they did not 
foresee serious economic  losses upon becoming unionized. Another po- 
tential cause of vintage effects is that workers supporting unions in the 
1980s tend to be disproportionately minority or female compared to the 
white males who organized decades earlier. 
Our Data Set 
As data sets like the Current Population Survey (CPS)  and National 
Labor Relations Board administrative records do not provide information 
on economic changes associated with new union organization, we devel- 
oped a new establishment-based data set to estimate the impact of new 
unionization in the  1980s. We developed our data through a three-step 
procedure. 
First, we  obtained from the Boston and Kansas City National  Labor 
Relations  Board districts  records  of establishments  that had elections during 
the 1980s. The states covered by the two districts are generally reflective S12  Freeman/Kleiner 
of the  national  labor  relations  environment.  A composite  ranking  of private- 
sector  union density  in the states  in our sample  was twenty-ninth  out of 
51 (the District  of Columbia  included).4 
Second,  we conducted  203  on-site  interviews  with  firms  that  had  elections 
with over  20 employees  in the bargaining  unit. Of the 243 firms  we con- 
tacted,  203 agreed to talk to us, for a response rate of 83.5%; 100 were in 
Boston and 103 were in Kansas City; 5% had elections in 1985; 31% in 
1984; 12% in 1983; 10% in 1982; 16% in 1981; 16% in 1980; and 10% in 
1979. In our original sample 8.4% went out of business or moved. To see 
if this was an abnormally high or low  rate, we determined the status of 
50 nonunion  "competitor establishments" that had no organizing drive 
during the  1980s and found that 8.5% went out of business or moved.5 
The win rate of unions in the NLRB elections in our sample was, moreover, 
virtually identical to the national average:  unions won 39% of the elections 
in our sample compared to a 38% win rate for all elections conducted in 
1981 with over 20 employees (Medoff 1984). The proportion of firms that 
lost elections and signed collective contracts  was also at the national average: 
64% of the elections won by unions in our sample produced signed col- 
lective contracts;  this compares with the 63% reported  by McDonald (1983) 
for the period 1979-82. 
Third, we obtained data for a "control" group of nonunion establish- 
ments that did not experience organizing drives during the 1980s.  Assuming 
that managers in the firms that experienced organizing drives had good 
information about close competitors, we asked them to name their two 
closest nonunion competitors in their region and interviewed those firms. 
We had less success in obtaining cooperation in this part of our study: we 
telephoned 362 companies and obtained 161 pairs for a response rate of 
44.5%.  However,  even with  this response rate, we  still ended up with 
matched competitors for approximately 80% of the establishments that 
had organizing drives. 
We use our sample of control establishments to evaluate the effects of 
new union organization on economic outcomes in two ways: (1) by con- 
trasting  changes in wages/personnel practices  in firms that faced organizing 
drives with all firms that did not; and (2)  by comparing firms that faced 
drives with their "closest competitor" and analyzing the paired differences. 
4The  states in our sample  that had NLRB election data included  Arkansas, 
Connecticut,  Iowa, Kansas,  Maine, Massachusetts,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  New 
Hampshire,  and  Vermont. 
5In  this case  we called  a random  group  of 80 nonunion  companies  that  had  no 
NLRB elections,  in the same  industry  and  area,  that  were  in business  in the same 
year as the NLRB election company.  If the firm was no longer in business  we 
asked  a local competitor  whether  the firm  that  closed  had a union  present  or had 
an NLRB election  during  the period  of interest.  If the answer  to both questions 
was no, it was counted  as having  closed  for purposes  of our control  study. Impact  of New Unionization  S13 
The paired comparisons provide a potentially useful way to control for 
sample selection or unobserved  variable  problems by allowing us to contrast 
establishments facing  organizing  drives with  "brother" establishments 
rather than with firms in general. If the pairing correctly give us sets of 
establishments  that are more alike than other establishments  in our sample, 
the variance of wages and benefits (other variables) between pairs prior 
to the organizing drive should be lower than the variance  between randomly 
selected  establishments.  This  is  because  the  common  component  of 
the  variation between  pairs is  removed  by  differencing. Formally,  let 
var(ln  Wi/Wj) be the variance of the natural logarithm wages and bene- 
fits (other variables) between paired establishments and let cov(ln  Wi, 
In Wj)  be the covariance between them due to common component. Then, 
since 
var(ln  Wi/Wj) = var In W,  + var In Wj  -  2 cov(ln  Wi, In Wj), 
var(ln Wi/Wj) < var In Wi + var In Wj 
when  cov  >  0 due to  a common  component.  In our sample, the rele- 
vant variances were var In Wi =  .022; var In Wj =  .019; var (In Wi/Wj) 
=  .024. Hence, the technique does indeed reduce unobserved differences 
among firms. 
Before turning to our empirical analysis, we  present three additional 
points on the data. First, note that although the sample is limited to 364 
establishments,  those  facing  organizing  drives  employed  over  64,000 
workers, while the control sample employed an additional 82,000 worker, 
so we are dealing with  sizeable numbers of workers. Second, while  the 
data lacks information on worker characteristics contained on CPS-type 
surveys, our measures of establishment characteristics  and paired compar- 
isons are likely to control for a significant proportion of the variance in 
wages due to differences among jobs: recent analysis of wages on estab- 
lishment and worker characteristics  finds that establishment characteristics 
account for at least as much of the variance in wages as personal (human 
capital) characteristics  (Groshen 1986). Third, by obtaining wage and other 
data on establishments before as well as after the union organizating drive, 
we difference away persistent unmeasured characteristics of work forces 
among establishments. 
II.  Empirical  Results 
In this section we present estimates of the impact of new union orga- 
nization  on wages, personnel practices,  and employment, first by comparing 
establishments  that faced organizing drives to all competitor establishments 
and then by comparing them to their paired "closest competitors."5 S14  Freeman/Kleiner 
Our first  set of wage estimates  are  based  on the following natural  log- 
arithm  wage equation: 
D  In Wti  = aUli + bU2j + cU3j + dZi + e In W01  +  ,ti,  (1) 
where D  In Wt,  is the wage change at the ith  establishment from 1 year 
before the NLRB election to t periods after the election or, for establish- 
ments that did not have an organizing drive, to t years after their pair faced 
a drive. 
Variables U1, U2, and U3 are dummy variables reflecting the outcome 
of the organizing drive:  whether it resulted in a union victory in the NLRB 
election and a collective contract (U1 = 1); a union victory with no contract 
(U2  =  1); or a union defeat (U3 =  1). Since American unions rely almost 
exclusively on signed collective contracts to affect outcomes, we focus on 
the estimated coefficients on the U1 dummy variable. 
Vector Z is a set of control variables, including a dummy variable for 
the NLRB district of the firm (Boston or Kansas City); dummy variables 
for whether the workers were production or nonproduction employees. 
The variable W0i  is the wage at the ith establishment 1 year before the 
organizing drive for establishments facing drives-and  in the same year as 
the relevant pair for those without a drive.6  The error term is uti. 
Our estimates, using paired comparisons, are based on the following 
equation: 
D  ln(W,/W))t  =  aUl  + bU2 + cU3 + d ln(W,/Wj)o + u,-i  (2) 
where Wi is the wage in the establishment facing an organizing drive, and 
Wj  is the wage in its pair; ln(Wi/Wj)o is the differential between the pairs 
1 year before the election. 
Table 1 presents the results of our analysis of changes in compensation 
(wages plus benefits as reported to our interviewers) for the periods from 
1 year before to  1 year after the election and from 1 year before to the 
6 There  are  two different  rationales  for controlling  for the initial  wage in these 
calculations,  based  on two different  underlying  structural  models.  The first  model 
is a regression  to mean  model in which we assume  that establishments  above  or 
below the average  wage tend to have  increases  that,  all else the same,  bring  them 
toward  the mean.  The second  model  derives  the change  equation  from  an equation 
relating  the level  of wages  to the  vector  of measured  variables  and  an  unobservable. 
Then  changes  in wages  are  obtained  by subtracting  the level  equation  in an earlier 
period  from the level equation  in t. If the unobservable  has the same  effect  over 
time,  the resultant  change  equation  does  not contain  the earlier  period  wage.  If the 
effect of the unobservable  changes  over time, it does contain  the earlier  period 
wage  as a right-hand-side  variable.  In this case  it is necessary  to do a bit of econo- 
metrics  to obtain  consistent  estimates,  as we report  in n. 8 below. See Freeman 
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time of the survey  for establishments  facing organizing  drives and our 
controls.  Because  some establishments  did not report  wages and benefits 
for all of these  periods,  our sample  falls short of the full 364 by nearly  a 
third.  The bulk of the missing observations  result from the absence  of 
figures  on wages and benefits  prior  to the organizing  drive.  On the basis 
of roughly  similar  wage and benefit  levels, at the time of the survey,  for 
establishments  that gave complete  figures  and those that did not, we do 
not believe  this data  problem  biases  our results. 
Turning  to the figures,  columns 1-3 of table 1 record  mean levels of 
compensation  in constant  1977  dollars  for an establishment  1 year  before 
the election, 1 year  after  the election,  and at the time of the survey  or, in 
the case of establishments that did not have organizing drives, the wages 
at the time 1 year before and 1 year after their "pair" faced drives and at 
the time of the survey. The means for 1 year before the election show that 
establishments  that faced drives had slightly lower compensation than those 
that did not, with plants that ended up with contracts having 2.9% lower 
pay than plants that did not face an organizing drive. The postelection 
period means show a different pattern, with pay higher in plants that faced 
drives, as would be expected given a direct union wage effect and potential 
threat effects on plants facing drives. Columns 4 and 5 present regression 
estimates of the impact of organizing drive outcomes on changes in wages 
using equation (1), with the diverse factors described there held fixed. The 
calculations show that workers in establishments that gained a contract 
had modest  but statistically significantly greater increases in  pay than 
workers in control establishments, from .03-.04 natural logarithm points. 
They also show  that pay rose slightly but insignificantly more in plants 
where the union won the election but failed to gain a contract than in the 
controls and rose somewhat more in establishments where the union lost 
the election, in this case by statistically significant amounts from 1 period 
before to the time of the survey.7  One possible interpretation  of the greater 
increase in wages in establishments that faced drives than in the controls 
is that the former raised  pay to deter further  organizing efforts, as predicted 
by models of union threat  or spillover effects. Note also that the differentials 
between establishments that faced and did not face organizing drives rose 
from 1 year after the election to the time of the survey, suggesting greater 
direct and spillover effects of unionism as time proceeds.  In no case,  however, 
does  the estimated  union-induced  premium  approach  anything  like the  standard 
union wage estimates  of 15%  -25%. 
7For a smaller  sample  of 160  establishments  we were  also  able  to examine  wages 
3 years  prior  to the election.  Regressing  real  wages 3 years  prior  on our dummy 
variables  for  organizing  category  and  controls  yielded  the following  estimates  (SEs 
in parentheses)  of the relation  between  future  organizing  activity  and  those  wages: 
union  wins election  and gains  contract,  -.01(.02);  union wins election  but does 
not gain contract,  .04(.03); union loses election,  -00(.01).  Hence, there  appears 
to be no strong  relation  between  wages  3 years  earlier  and organizing  outcomes. Impact of New  Unionization  S17 
Table  2 
Estimates  of Differences  in Change  of Log Real  Wages for an 
Establishment  from  Its Pair 
Regression Coefficient for 
Changes in Natural Logarithm  Impact of Organizing Outcomes 
Wages and Benefits in  on Log Change in Wages and 
Establishments Facing  Benefits Relative to Its Pair 
Organizing Drives Minus 
Changes in Its Pair  1 Year Prior 
1 Year Prior  to Date of 
1 Year Prior  1 Year After  to 1 Year After  Survey 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Contract  .02  .04  .00  .07 
(.01)  (.03) 
No  contract  -.01  -.01  -.04  -.01 
(.02)  (.03) 
Loses election  .03  .04  -.00  .04 
(.01)  (.01) 
NOTE-SEs are in parentheses.  The sample  size for calculations  is 62 pairs  or 124 establishments. 
Regressions  include  controls  for region  and  the differences  in wages  1 year  before  the election. 
In addition to the calculations in the table, we also estimated several 
other econometric specifications of equation (1). In one specification we 
instrumented the base-period compensation in equation (1) on the base- 
period compensation in a different period.8 In another specification we 
weighted  observations  by  numbers  of  workers  in  an  establishment. 
The results in all these experiments corroborated the findings reported in 
table 1. 
Paired Comparisons 
Table 2 presents our estimates of  the difference between changes in 
compensation in establishments and their pair. Columns  1 and 2 record 
the mean of the differences between the natural  logarithm changes in com- 
pensation in an establishment undergoing an organizing drive and in its 
pair over the specified period. They confirm the greater increase in com- 
pensation in establishments in which the union wins an election and gains 
a contract found in table 1; reveal slightly smaller changes in pay in es- 
tablishments in which unions win but fail to gain a contract than in their 
nonorganizing pairs; and show modestly higher changes in compensation 
in establishments in which the union loses the election than in their pairs. 
Finally, columns 3 and 4 record the regression coefficients for the effects 
of the various organizing outcomes from equation (2). In these calculations 
8 Specifically,  we regressed  the wage level 1 year  before  the drive  on the wage 
level  3 years  before  and  on the  other  variables  in the  equation  and  used  the  predicted 
value  as the control  for wage level in the regression  for changes  in wages  from 1 
year  before  to 1 year after.  This allows for the possibility  that the lagged  wage 
term  will  be correlated  with the  residual  in the change  equation.  The  instrumenting 
eliminates  this potential  source  of bias. S18  Freeman/KLeiner 
we omitted the constant term from the regression so that the coefficients 
on  the organizing-drive category variables reflect the difference in pay 
between establishments and their pair in a given category (conditional on 
the year of the election and the differential 1 year before the election). For 
establishments where the union won a contract the estimates show greater 
wage increases than in their pairs from 1 year prior to the current period 
but not from 1 year prior to 1 year after; for establishments where unions 
won elections but were unable to gain contracts the estimates show neg- 
ligible losses in pay relative to the pair; while for establishments where 
the union lost the election, the regressions show increases in compensation 
relative to their pair from 1 year before to the current period but not to 1 
year after. The primary difference between these results and those in table 
1 is the greater  indication that plants that faced organizing drives obtained 
larger wage gains as time proceeded. Still, the key finding remains: the 
estimated union effects on wages in newly organized plants fall short of 
those obtained from CPS and other cross-section data sets, indicating that 
one cannot extrapolate those estimates to the margin of newly organized 
workplaces. 
Personnel Practices 
In addition to obtaining wage and benefits information from establish- 
ments that faced organizing drives and their competitors, we also asked 
whether firms introduced, eliminated, or left unchanged a diverse set of 
personnel practices, ranging from fringe benefits to seniority policies to 
grievance arbitration  to profit sharing. As the responses showed that firms 
either introduced or left unchanged all practices except for profit-sharing 
plans, which they either eliminated or left unchanged, we coded the vari- 
ables as 0-1  dichotomies, with 0 reflecting the unchanged category and 1 
reflecting a change for all practices save profit sharing; there we used the 
o to reflect the decrease in profit-sharing and 1 to reflect maintaining a 
plan. We used a logistic function to estimate the impact of the organizing 
drive outcomes: 
P1  = 1/[1 + exp -  (aU1i + bU21  + cU31  + dxi +  ul)],  (3) 
where P, is the probability of introducing/eliminating  a practice; and the 
categorical and control variables are as before. 
Table 3 presents our analysis of the effect of the union organizing drives 
on the four personnel practices that we found were affected by new union- 
ization. For each practice, columns 1 and 2 record the prevalence of the 
practice 1 year before and 1 year after the organizing drive; column 3 gives 
the change in the prevalence of the practice, while column 4 contrasts the 
change between the organizing establishments and their paired controls; 
finally, column 5 presents estimated logistic coefficients for equation (3). Impact of New  Unionization  S19 
Table  3 
Estimates  of the  Impact of Organizing  Activity  on Personnel  Practices 
Logit 
Presence of Practice  Coefficients 
A in  for Impact 
1 Year  1 Year  A in  Practice  of Organizing 
Personnel Practices  before  after  Practice  versus A  Activity 
and Organizing  Election  Election  (2 -  1)  in Pair  on Practice 
Activity  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Grievance 
procedure: 
Contract  .38  .86  .48  .35  3.09 
(.58) 
No  contract  .46  .64  .18  -.06  .62 
(.90) 
Loses election  .49  .66  .17  .12  1.01 
(.51) 
No  drive  .43  .51  .08  .  ..  ... 
Written seniority 
provision: 
Contract  .42  .70  .28  .23  1.74 
(.62) 
No  contract  .39  .71  .32  .18  1.64 
(.71) 
Loses election  .53  .63  .10  .08  .38 
(.60) 
No  drive  .31  .36  .05  .  ..  ... 
Written posting of 
promotion 
opportunities: 
Contract  .40  .66  .26  .24  1.32 
(.52) 
No  contract  .61  .75  .14  -.13  -.75 
(1.10) 
Loses election  .67  .76  .09  -.03  .05 
(.50) 
No  drive  .49  .57  .08  .  ..  ... 
Profit sharing: 
Contract  .36  .24  -.12  -.21  -1.60 
(1.80) 
No  contract  .57  .68  .11  .06  -.92 
(1.10) 
Loses election  .55  .63  .08  .02  -.66 
(.53) 
No  drive  .43  .51  .08  .  .  .  .  .  . 
NOTE.-SEs  are in parentheses,  logistic  equations  included.  Regressions  include  controls  for region, 
wages 1 year  before  the election,  dummies  for year  of election,  and whether  workers  are production 
workers  or not. Sample  size = 364. 
Consistent with cross-section analyses of the effect of unionism on fringe 
benefits (Freeman 1981), the results show that union contracts significantly 
increase the prevalence of formal grievance procedures, written seniority 
system for promotions or layoffs and recalls, and written posting of pro- 
motions-practices  that are generally viewed  as part of  the "industrial 
jurisprudence"  (Slichter, Healy, and Livernash 1960) or "collective voice" S20  Freeman/Kleiner 
(Freeman and Medoff 1984) face of unionism-while  reducing the prev- 
alence of profit-sharing plans. In addition to the personnel practices in 
table 3, we  also examined the effect of  new unionism on several other 
practices-written  sick leave, funeral leave, pensions, military/jury  duty 
pay-and  found modest, insignificant union impacts. 
All told, we view the finding of significant union effects on industrial 
jurisprudence/voice personnel practices  in the absence  of large wage effects 
as supporting the importance of the "voice" face of unionism. 
Employment 
The extent to which new unionization is associated with reductions in 
employment at the establishment level provides a potential check on our 
wage and benefit findings and some insight into the issue of whether unions 
negotiate monopoly  wage gains or efficient contracts. In general, extant 
research  has not found substantial  union employment effects with industry 
or state employment data, although employment has shifted away from 
unionized sectors and states. One interpretation of these aggregate results 
is that losses of employment associated with unionism may be balanced 
by gains to competing nonunion firms. Another is that unions negotiate 
sufficient job security provisions to produce efficient contracts that do not 
reduce employment below competitive levels. Another is that the research 
designs fail to capture  union employment effects that occurred  when unions 
first established their wage premia. 
The evidence from our survey, based on changes in establishment em- 
ployment from the time of the NLRB election to the time of the survey, 
present a different picture of the relation between unionization and em- 
ployment  than that found in more aggregated data. As  can be seen in 
column 1 of table 4, our data show that while employment grew in control 
establishments, those that faced organizing drives had either no increase 
in employment or had reductions in employment. (This is the case where 
unions won the election but could not get a contract.) Column 2 of table 
4 confirms this result with a regression analysis that controls for region, 
whether workers are production workers or not, the year the election was 
held, and so on.9 
While some may wish to interpret these results as indicating that new 
unionization and union organizing drives reduce employment from what 
9 We  also  compared  changes  in employment  in firms  that  faced  organizing  drives 
with the changes  in their  pairs.  Due to the number  of firms  that did not report 
employment  there  were  just  62 such  observations,  making  the results  suspect.  Still, 
these  calculations  showed  a pattern  similar  to that  in table  5, with plants  in which 
unions  won a contract  experiencing  losses of employment  relative  to their  pair, 
and those in which unions won an election but could not gain a contract  also 
showing  relative  declines  in employment.  Only the group  in which  unions  lost the 
election  did not show such a pattern. Impact  of  New  Unionization  S21 
Table 4 
Estimates  of the Impact of Union Activity on Establishment 
Employment Change 
Regression Coefficients 
Mean A in Natural  for Natural Logarithm 
Logarithm Employment:  A in Employment: 
Date of Election to Date  Date of Election 
Category (No.  of  of Survey  to Date of Survey 
Establishments)  (1)  (2) 
Contract (N = 48)  -.00  -.09 
(.04) 
No  contract (N =  15)  -.08  -.13 
(.04) 
Loses election (N =  119)  .01  -.06 
.03 
No  drive (N =  118)  .07  .  .  . 
NOTE.-SEs  in parentheses.  Regressions  include  controls  for  region  (Boston  or Kansas  City)  wage  levels 
on year  before  the election,  occupation,  and  year  in which  the election  was  held. 
it might otherwise be, we suggest caution due to the fact that employment 
decreased  most, absolutely and relatively,  in establishments  where the union 
won  the election but could not gain a contract. If union-induced wage 
gains were the main factor behind the slower growth of employment in 
the establishments that faced drives, changes in employment should have 
been least where the union gained contracts, not where they failed to gain 
contracts: after all, table 1 showed that wages increased less rapidly in the 
union wins, no contract category. It is possible that our data are picking 
up a relation between employment patterns and the locus of organizing 
activity, rather than measuring the effect of collective bargaining on em- 
ployment: firms experiencing drops in employment may have the types 
of personnel problems that lead workers to seek union protection. Un- 
fortunately we lack employment figures over a longer period or other data 
to probe the observed relation. At the least, however, our analysis shows 
that establishment comparisons, unlike aggregate analyses, do show that 
firms that were organized had slower employment growth than comparison 
firms, which  suggests that future analysis of  union  employment  effects 
focus on newly organized establishments rather than aggregate data. 
III.  Econometric  Probes and Interpretation 
To what extent can our results  be generalized  beyond the samples studied? 
Given that we could not conduct a controlled random-assignment exper- 
iment, how  applicable are our estimated modest wage effects for other 
establishments  in the 1980s?  How important are the period, age, and vintage 
effects-described  at the outset-in  explaining the difference between our 
results and the much larger wage estimates based on CPS-type data sets? 
The question of whether our findings can be generalized beyond the S22  Freeman/Kleiner 
sample  relates  to the potential  selectivity  bias in studying  establishments 
that  faced  organizing  drives  and  their  close  competitors.  While  it is common 
to think of selectivity bias in estimating the union wage effect in terms of 
the difference between the union premium conditional on the observed 
union (and nonunion) sample and the differential that would result from 
random organization of  a set of workers or establishments, we  do not 
believe that this is the most useful way to express the problem. What is 
relevant is not what unionization would do to a randomly chosen estab- 
lishment but rather what it would do to establishments with a reasonable 
chance of being unionized-to  firms close to the margin of being organized 
rather than to  the average nonunion  establishment. To  the extent that 
those "marginal" firms more closely resemble the establishments in our 
sample than the  average nonunion  establishment, an estimate of  what 
unionism would do to a randomly selected firm would provide a misleading 
picture of the potential effects of new organization. What one wants to 
know is the impact of unionization on establishment wages weighted by 
the probability of organization in the relevant period. In an environment 
where union organizing is infrequent, we believe that our sample of es- 
tablishments is likely to offer a closer proxy to the desired weighted sample 
than a random collection of firms. The selectivity problem, then, is not 
one  of  correcting for the nonrandom nature of  our sample but rather 
checking whether there are differences between the establishments that 
faced drives and their competitors that did not that might bias our estimate 
of the impact of unionization. We examine the issue in two ways. First, 
we estimate how well measured variables, prior to the organizing drive, 
predict which  establishments face drives and, conditional on the drive, 
how  well  they predict the outcomes.  Second, we  add an inverse Mills 
correction, based on the probability of facing a drive, to our change in pay 
regressions and examine that calculation's impact on our estimates. 
Table 5 summarizes our analysis of organizing outcomes and the impact 
of wages and benefits, personnel practices, and other variables before the 
union organizing drive. Column 1 gives maximum-likelihood estimates of 
a logit equation that an establishment has an organizing drive. It shows 
that wages and benefits do  not  significantly affect the probability of  a 
drive, and that only seniority provisions and health coverage among per- 
sonnel practices have discernible impacts. The presence of seniority rules 
raises the chance of a drive, possibly because workers in nonunion firms 
do not feel that supervisors apply the rule fairly, while health coverage is 
also associated with  a higher probability of an organizing drive, for no 
apparent  reason. Columns 2 and 3 summarize the results of similar analysis 
of the chances that, conditional on an election, unions would win, and, 
conditional on a win, that they would obtain a contract. Here, we employ 
a proportional hazards model that an organizing campaign has taken place 
(Lawless 1982). In column 2 of table 5 only one variable is significant, the 
presence of a written grievance procedure, which reduces the likelihood Impact of New  Unionization  S23 
Table 5 
Maximum-Likelihood  Estimates  of Organizing  Category  Outcomes 
Having  an  Losing  to  Signing  a 
Organization  Drive*  Uniont  Contractt 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Prior grievance  -.27  -.67  .63 
(.37)  (.37)  (2.43) 
Prior seniority  .82  .22  -.71 
(.34)  (.36)  (.87) 
Prior all health  .54  .50  -1.23 
(.30)  (.41)  (3.25) 
Wage  I year  prior  to election  -.1 1  .19  -1.14 
(.16)  (.19)  (1.73) 
NOTF.-SEs  are  in  parentheses.  All  regressions  include  controls  for  written  posting  or  promotion  op- 
portunities,  pension  plan,  relocation  assistance,  severance  pay,  funeral  leave,  military  or jury  duty,  for 
region,  and  for  whether  workers  were  or  were  not  production  workers. 
* Logistic  coefficients  are  shown  in  col.  1. 
t Hazard  coefficients  are  shown  in  cols.  2 and  3. 
of a union win in an election. This is consistent with evidence that "positive" 
labor relations reduces chances of union victories. The coefficients in col- 
umn 3 yield, by contrast, no significant impact for any variable on the 
probability that a firm would sign a contract. None  of the calculations is 
sufficiently striking to suggest serious selectivity bias problems in our earlier 
analysis. 
Still, we sought to "correct" our results for possible selectivity bias by 
estimating a probit variant  of the column 1 equation, calculating  the inverse 
Mills ratio, and adding the term to our wage regressions. As we did not 
include the existence of personnel practices in the wage regression, iden- 
tification comes not only from the nonlinear functional form but also from 
the assumption that personnel practices affect organizing drives but not 
future wage increases.  The inverse Mills term did not enter the calculations 
with a significant coefficient and had only slight effects on the estimated 
coefficients on  organizing categories.'0 Hence,  our major finding-that 
the union wage effect is much smaller for newly unionized firms than indi- 
cated by the standard  cross-section estimates-is  unaffected by this econo- 
metric probe. 
Our Results versus Cross-Section Union Wage Gaps 
Accepting our estimates as correct, what might explain the difference 
in magnitude between them and the union/nonunion  wage differentials 
found in CPS and related surveys? One possibility is that the difference 
reflects differences between  establishment-based and  individual-based 
'0 In particular,  for the regression  of change  in wages 1 year  prior  to the drive 
to the current  period,  the estimated  impacts  (SEs in parentheses)  of organizing 
categories  was:  union wins contract,  .031 (.027); union wins election  but fails to 
gain contract, .00(.03);  union loses election, .04(.02). S24  Freeman/Kleiner 
analyses,  with establishment-based  estimates smaller because establishment 
data control better for workplace-related wage differentials that are cor- 
related with unionism than do individual-based data. Absent a detailed 
investigation of union wage effects from both individual and establishment 
sources, we are unable to assess the magnitude of this possibility, though 
we do believe that it is of some potential importance in explaining our 
results. 
A second possibility is that our estimated union wage effects differ from 
those in cross-section studies because of the time period we have covered. 
To  assess this, consider the differential change in union  and nonunion 
wages in the mid  1980s as reported in Bureau of  Labor Statistics' Em- 
ployment Cost Index:  these data  show that from 1983 to 1986 compensation 
of union workers increased by  15.6% compared to 20.4%  for nonunion 
workers, reducing the union premium by perhaps 5 percentage points." 
As this falls short of the 15-20 percentage-point differential between our 
estimated .03-.04  natural-logarithm-point union wage effect and cross- 
section union wage gaps, we believe that while period effects are important 
in explaining the differences, they are not the whole story. 
A third possibility is cohort effects. As neither our analysis of the factors 
that caused organizing drives nor of the selectivity bias in wage regressions 
indicated that the firms facing drives were markedly different than their 
competitors, we  do not believe cohort effects are that important in ex- 
plaining our results. Perhaps union organizing in the 1980s was motivated 
by the same unmeasured management treatment of workers that industrial 
relations studies found to  have caused successful unionization  in other 
periods of time (Rees 1977, p. 26) rather than by any special cohort effect. 
A fourth possibility is that age or first-contract effects explain much of 
the difference between  our estimates of  the impact of  unionization  on 
wages and those  in  CPS-type cross-section regressions. While  we  lack 
direct evidence on this point, the consistency of our findings with those 
on the effects of teacher unionization on newly organized school districts 
is certainly suggestive of first-contract effects. The finding that new union 
organization had substantial effects on nonwage working conditions but 
not on wages and benefits also seems to point in this direction. Absent 
data on future wage settlements in our sample, however, we cannot de- 
termine the magnitude of the first-contract effect. 
IV. Conclusion 
This article has presented the results of a survey of 364 establishments 
covering over 146,000 workers, some which faced union organizing drives 
during the 1980s and some which did not face such drives. Our data show 
1l These changes are from December 1982 to Decmber 1986. Union compensation 
rose more rapidly than nonunion compensation prior to 1983. See U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Employment Cost Index (various issues), quarterly. Impact of New  Unionization  S25 
that firms  that lost elections  to unions  and signed  collective  contracts  in- 
creased  wages and benefits  more rapidly  than control firms  but fell far 
short of the gains needed to reach  the 15%-25%  union wage premium 
found  in cross-section  studies.  Our  data  also  show  that  the newly  organized 
workers  obtained  substantial  "voice"  benefits  such  as  grievance  procedures 
and  seniority  provisions,  while experiencing  declines  in employment  com- 
pared  to control  firms.  We hypothesize  that  the small  wage  effects  that  we 
found are likely to reflect "period"  effects due to the economic environment 
of the 1980s and "first-contract"  effects due to the tendency of new union 
organizations to use their bargaining power to enhance industrial democ- 
racy and decision making by rules rather than to raise wages. They may 
also reflect differences  in the estimated  size of union wage premium between 
establishment and individual-worker data sets. 
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